Assessing Syriza’s first month in office: why Greece remains a long way from a break with austerity by Exadaktylos, Theofanis
03/03/2015
Assessing Syriza’s ﬁrst month in oﬃce: why Greece remains a
long way from a break with austerity
blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/03/03/assessing-syrizas-ﬁrst-month-in-oﬃce-why-greece-remains-a-long-way-from-a-break-with-austerity/
The new Greek government, led by the Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza), won power on 25
January. Theofanis Exadaktylos assesses the government’s ﬁrst month in oﬃce. He notes that
while Syriza won the election with a commitment to renegotiate the country’s bailout agreement, the
subsequent negotiations have proven even more challenging than might have been expected, not
least due to internal opposition within the party itself.
It is already over a month since the new Greek government took oﬃce amid high expectations
among the electorate: namely that it would renegotiate the terms of the bailout agreement with the
EU and no more constraints would come about as a result of the memorandum of understanding with the Troika – in
fact, the promise was that there would be no Troika at all. Led by Syriza and accompanied by the right-wing
Independent Greeks, the new government brought forward proposals to the country’s European partners to amend
the agreements, move away from a policy of austerity and focus more on moving towards development and growth.
The state of play in Greece on the day after the election was the following: the electoral campaign period had
postponed a number of reforms that were under way; it had halted tax payments by people hoping to receive tax
relief; it had given hopes to a number of public sector workers who had been made redundant that they would be
able to return to their positions; and an overall sentiment of optimism for the capacity to renegotiate with Europe was
prevalent. While that sentiment had given Syriza a boost on Election Day, it had created a largely sceptical
European and international climate, as well as fret and irritation amongst its lenders.
Assessing Syriza’s performance so far
Syriza commenced its term in oﬃce on a populist programme and set out its ﬁnancial plan. It placed a highly visible
academic, Yanis Varoufakis, in charge of the Ministry of Finance and at the driver’s seat of the negotiations with the
EU. From the outset, Varoufakis was certain that the propositions of the government to the country’s European
partners would be so good that they would not be able to deny Greece a chance. In the ﬁrst round of meetings,
Syriza ‘killed’ the Troika and argued that from now on it would be speaking only to institutional representatives.
During the second phase of negotiations, discussions were held with European partners without reaching a
conclusion and with the Greek government providing a highly vague narrative as to how it proposed to settle the
matter. The government also refused to sign oﬀ on the extension of the Greek programme, which was seen as the
extension of the memorandum. Given that Syriza was elected under an anti-memorandum platform, there was a
considerable political cost to pay if it accepted an extension without a ﬁght.
Finally, after dramatic meetings, battles over the wording, signiﬁcant anxiety for the future of Greece, nervous
market responses and a few staged protests of support for the new government, the ministers of the Eurozone
agreed to extend the programme for another four months. The memorandum was still alive and kicking, although it
now had a diﬀerent name: a bridging agreement until a new deal could be struck with Europe.
On the day after the new agreement was reached, the government in Greece therefore found itself ﬁghting on three
fronts: one internal to the party in oﬃce, a domestic struggle to maintain support, and the external dimension to
change the government’s image in Europe.
The internal front
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In a previous EUROPP article, I had ﬂagged up the potential U-turn that Syriza would eﬀectively be making in
several of its pledges to the electorate. To that extent,
I argued that given the radical factions that exist
within the party, Syriza would have a hard time
tailoring its policies and messages to its own
members and MPs. The party is a conglomerate of a
number of diﬀerent left-wing factions who had come
together under a unitary organisation for electoral
purposes. While Syriza represented the radical left in
terms of its position in the ideological spectrum, its
electoral victory had turned it into a typical
mainstream party of the centre-left, eﬀectively
replacing Pasok as the alternative pole for oﬃce.
The exhilaration of the ﬁrst few days following the
electoral victory has now turned into restlessness for
some of the more radical key members of the party,
who, since the agreement was reached with the
country’s European partners, have started to become
more vocal, expressing stark opposition to the way the negotiation process has been handled by the government.
There is already a group of 30 or so Syriza MPs (including the president of the parliament) who have declared
themselves to be against the new agreement with the Eurozone, creating a sense of friction among the party’s
ranks.
In addition, an important historical ﬁgure of the party and MEP, Manolis Glezos, was quick to apologise to the
electorate for the new agreement, criticising it on the basis that it was nothing more than giving a diﬀerent name to
the old one. This internal opposition is not likely to fade out – especially among those hardliners who wish to remain
loyal to their ideological principles. This may lead Syriza to try to bypass a vote in Parliament to suppress the
visibility of this internal opposition in the media.
The domestic front
Syriza is still searching for a way to manage the articulation of the party’s political messages to the Greek people. As
it stands, the new agreement will be the roadmap for cooperation with the EU institutions until June. Citizens are
expecting to see Syriza maintaining its promises; however, it now seems highly unlikely that any substantial
alternative measures can or will be taken prior to that deadline. Syriza claims that its programmatic platform was on
a four-year horizon rather than immediate and that is likely to cause some further friction.
As with any party in government, there is an expectation that Syriza’s popularity will drop and support for the party
will go down. The case in Greece however, is that the opposition is so highly fragmented and voters are so
disillusioned with the previous parties in government that it may take a while for a signiﬁcant rhetorical resistance to
appear and for support to start declining.
The good intentions of the government are not being questioned in this sense; what is doubtful is whether Syriza
has enough prior experience of handling diﬃcult messages without failures emerging in its communication strategy.
When the government could not reach an agreement a few weeks ago, it was still shifting the blame on to inﬂexible
European positions, while at the same time articulating a vague message at home as to the actual position of the
government or the result of the negotiations process.
With the new agreement in place – which eﬀectively replaces the old one but continues on the same path in terms of
the associated measures – Syriza’s task of tweaking its message to keep the electorate on side will be extremely
challenging. This is particularly true given the internal opposition within the party, as the burden of the political cost
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will begin to weigh heavily on some of the more hard-line radical left MPs.
The external front
What now for the future of Greece within the Eurozone and the EU? Certainly, relations remain tense. There are a
number of domestic political games taking place across EU member states – small or large, old or new. Britain is
considering its own future in light of this agreement and the inability of a government to easily renegotiate terms in
Europe. The Spanish government, fearing the potential victory of Podemos in elections later this year, is holding its
breath until the issue is resolved. Alongside Portugal and Ireland, Spain has a stake in the easing of the rules for
Greece, given that these countries have been able to push reforms forward and manage their debt better.
In some of the new member states, the negotiation process has also been closely followed, particularly in those
countries which have just entered the Eurozone following certain rules of the game in terms of ﬁscal discipline.
France, on the other hand, not wanting to disturb its relations with Germany and challenge the Franco-German
nexus within European integration, did voice some concerns that led to a more favourable wording (if not more
favourable measures) in the agreement document.
Finally, Germany has its own domestic political issues to contend with. Angela Merkel is currently tied into a coalition
government with the SPD, but must also ameliorate the domestic populist rhetoric that has introduced
Euroscepticism into the country. Alternatively, in the Netherlands, the Dutch government has become the latest
victim of populist narratives surrounding the Greek crisis, with Jeroen Dijsselbloem now playing a central role as the
President of the Eurogroup, which requires maintaining a hard line in negotiations.
This external front is therefore far from straightforward for Greece: what has been portrayed as a struggle for dignity
at home has less charitably been regarded as begging for favours at the European level. This has deﬁnitely placed
the country in an onerous position, where European political leaders have to defend their choices both at home to
their own electorates and to their counterparts in Europe. For the time being, things seem to have quelled down, but
they are likely to pick up again as we head towards June. Syriza had its moment following its electoral victory, but
when reality hits home, it will undoubtedly be consumed by mainstream politics.
The emperor’s new clothes
The Syriza government has already back-tracked on several fronts and continues to reshuﬄe its agenda and
priorities in light of the political realities it now faces. There is undoubtedly a steep learning curve for the
government, and the inexperienced party leadership deserves some time to adjust their style as they acquire the
tricks of the trade. However, the pressure is immense not only because of the domestic front, but due to the global
scrutiny under which Greece is being placed.
For all the carefully constructed messages articulated by Syriza, the ‘new agreement’ is indeed still a memorandum
in disguise, the discussions with the institutions are still being led by a form of ‘troika’, and Greece has not managed
to unhook itself from its obligations and commitment to austerity. The emperor simply has new clothes.
Syriza should keep in mind its commitment that the people of Greece should no longer suﬀer from the crisis. Instead
of playing political games, it should concentrate on the areas where it can make a genuine diﬀerence in people’s
lives. Failure to do so will consign the party to playing yet another role in the wider domestic and European political
theatre that continues to play out around the Eurozone.
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